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This paper explains contemporaneous exit and entry in a new industry with a
diﬀusion process across submarkets. It allows a re-interpretation of the shakeout
process in some industries in a novel way. The industry is a collection of initially
inactive independent submarkets; the timing of their activation is determined
by an exogenous aggregate diﬀusion process. New submarket opening attracts
new entry. However, the post-entry endogenous sunk investment requirement
induced by innovations also forces much exit to follow entry. The aggregate
market thus has overlapping exit and entry; and has a shakeout if the aggregate
diﬀusion process follows a typical S-shape.
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The shakeout process, ﬁrst documented for a wide set of U.S. manufacturing
industries1 by Gort and Klepper (1982), involves excessive initial entry followed
by a process of rapid and substantial exit. Later work has focused on giving
a more precise empirical description of the process, particularly details about
gross entry, exit and ﬁrm survival patterns (Klepper and Miller (1995); Klepper
and Simons (2000), Klepper and Simons (2001); Klepper (2002)). A surprising
ﬁnding of the recent related literature is the fact that at the (narrowly-deﬁned)
industry level the occurrences of entry mostly overlap with exits. This does not
square easily with the textbook model, which predicts that within each market
entry should occur in response to positive net proﬁt at the margin while exit
should occur in response to net loss, but they should never occur at the same
time.2 In some industry shakeouts, the overlapping entry and exit are very
dramatic, making them particularly puzzling.
This paper intends to explain contemporaneous exit and entry in a new
industry with a diﬀusion process across submarkets. It allows a re-interpretation
of the shakeout process in some industries in a novel way. The main idea is
that the aggregate market data typically used in studies of shakeouts can be
interpreted as coming from aggregation of (oligopolistic) submarkets linked by
some speciﬁc (exogenous) process of diﬀusion of the major product innovation.
The notion of submarket is central in the current investigation. It high-
lights the importance of market deﬁnition3 to understanding market structure.4
Applying the standard textbook delineation of market deﬁnition, a submarket
(as opposed to the aggregate market) of an industry (ideally) should identify a
relevant economic market which “consists of a set of products, a set of buyers,
a set of seller, and a geographic region in which the buyers and sellers interact
and determine prices for each product” (Church and Ware (2000)). Under ideal
market deﬁnition any two products oﬀered in the same submarket should be
close substitutes, while any two products traded in separate submarkets ought
to be distant substitutes. Given that the deﬁnition of submarkets has both a
product dimension and a geographical dimension, any two separate submarkets
should share a ‘marked gap in the chain of substitutes’ (Robinson (1954)) in
either of these two dimensions.
Following the pioneering work of Sutton (1997) and Sutton (1998), we base
our analysis on the key assumption that the industries (of interest to the current
1These are very disaggregated categories of industries, which correspond to 5 or 7-digit
SIC codes.
2This contradiction has been previously noted by Geroski (1995) and Caves (1998) in their
surveys of the broad literature on ﬁrm entry, exit and growth. The ﬁndings cited there,
however, are based on more aggregated industry data, at 2 to 4-digit SIC code levels.
3The issue of market deﬁnition is not new (see Schmalensee (1982)). It has been central
in the area of enforcement of competition policy. In fact it is often the case that competition
laws have a statutory requirement for identiﬁcation of market in which there is a substantial
lessoning or prevention of competition.
4See Sutton (1997) and Sutton (1998) for the role of submarkets in aﬀecting aggregate
market structure, particularly ﬁrm size distribution.
1study) consist of multiple (approximately) independent submarkets. We can
then attribute the determination of the evolution of industry-wide market struc-
ture to the connection between innovation diﬀusion process and submarkets. To
elaborate how the notions of submarkets and exogenous diﬀusion process work
together, a summary of the theoretical model is in order. The industry is a
collection of initially inactive independent submarkets with identical demand
structure. The only link among submarkets is an exogenous aggregate diﬀusion
process that determines when a particular submarket becomes active and when
production starts (as a function of how many submarkets are already in opera-
tion). Correspondingly there is an aggregate timing relative to the industry as
a whole and the timing in each particular submarket. The complete timing in
a submarket is: (i) ﬁrst a new product is exogenously invented in submarket j
(in this case submarket j is the ﬁrst market to be activated in the industry) or
it is introduced from a diﬀerent submarket into submarket j by the exogenous
diﬀusion process. Firms in submarket j have to decide if entering production
of such new good: in this case a forward looking free entry condition applies.
This is time tj = 0 for submarket j. (ii) After entry, all ﬁrms initially play a
symmetric Cournot game of quantity competition. This is from time tj = 0 to
time tj = Tj for submarket j. (iii) At some random point of time Tj (deter-
mined by the outcome of a random search process) an innovation arrives in the
submarket and presents all existing ﬁrm with the option to incur an endoge-
nous sunk cost to increase the quality of their products. The ﬁrms’ decisions on
whether making the sunk investments or not are in fact determining if staying
or exiting: a second zero proﬁt condition applies for them and a shakeout might
take place. (iv) For times tj ≥ Tj the remaining ﬁrms play a repeated static
Cournot game with diﬀerentiated quality. The game in a submarket is solved
with backward induction starting from time Tj. The industry-wide evolution
of aggregate quantity of the new good produced and aggregate number of ﬁrms
can easily be derived by aggregating the submarkets and by taking into account
the timing imposed by the exogenous diﬀusion process.
It is easy to see why this model predicts industry-wide contemporaneous exit
and entry while still consistent with the textbook model of entry and exit. Here
the relevant economic markets are the submarkets. Within each submarket, the
model predicts that exit should follow entry rather than occur at the same time.
It is the industry-wide diﬀusion process that makes the exits in some submarkets
to coincide in time with the entries in some later activated submarkets. As we
impose a plausible speciﬁc structure to the diﬀusion process, i.e., assuming that
the number of active submarkets follows an S-shape time path (implying the
submarket activation rate having a Bell-shape proﬁle), the model demonstrates
substantial power in explaining the aggregate market data, in particular, of the
U.S. automotive tire industry, for which we delineate the submarkets in detail
in the empirical part (section 5) of the paper.
2Figure 1: Numbers of entry, exit and ﬁrms (Tires, U.S.)
(Reproduced from: Klepper and Simons (2000), Fig. 1)
2 Stylized facts and alternative explanations
Figure 1 shows a striking example of shakeouts, which happened in the U.S.
automotive tire industry. This kind of sharp fall in the number of ﬁrms earned
the phenomenon its name. New evidence allows a disaggregation of the pattern.
In Figure 1, the time path of the number of ﬁrms can be decomposed as a
combination of the time paths of gross entry and gross exit. Two patterns that
appear in Figure 1 turn out to hold more generally.
Fact A: For a product that experienced a shakeout, the time path of gross
entry roughly had a Bell-shape, which spanned a interval of a few decades,
peaked shortly prior to the peak of the number of ﬁrms.
Klepper and Miller (1995) examined 16 of the 46 major new products studied
by Gort and Klepper (1982). All of the 9 shakeout products in their sample
displayed the above described pattern of gross entry. (Also see Agarwal and Gort
(1996); Klepper and Simons (2001); Klepper (2002)). As for the pattern of gross
exit, Klepper and Miller (1995) found that for all 16 products in their sample,
gross exit is positively correlated with lagged gross entry. Using smoothed
time series of gross entry and exit, the average correlation between the exit
series and the ‘optimally’ lagged entry series was 0.80 with the average ‘optimal’
lag in entry being 3 years. This result is aﬃrmative to the ﬁndings in the
voluminous literature on ﬁrm turnovers using data of more aggregate categories
of manufacturing industries (e.g., Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988); see
Caves (1998) for a comprehensive survey). The latter literature documents a
rich body of evidence of positive correlation between gross exit and lagged gross
entry; and moreover it closely relates this regularity to another important ﬁnding
pertaining to ﬁrm survival rate over age, that is: “Entrants suﬀer from high rates
of infant mortality” (Caves (1998)). The recent studies of ﬁrm survival pattern
3in the (more narrowly deﬁned) industries that experienced severe shakeouts
(see Klepper and Simons (2000), Klepper and Simons (2001); Klepper (2002))
conﬁrm this general ﬁnding.
Fact B: There is a high rate of ‘infant mortality’ among entrants, i.e., a large
fraction of new entrants exit at an early age, e.g., more than half drop out
within 5 to 10 years; the exit rate gradually eases oﬀ after the early years.
In his survey on “What do we know about entry?”, Geroski (1995) com-
mented: “[E]ntry appears to be relatively easy, but survival is not. The most
palpable consequence of entry is exit, and industries that exhibit high entry
rates often also exhibit a high degree of churn at the bottom of the size distri-
bution.” His conclusion was: “If one accepts the proposition that the barriers
to entry facing small entrants are generally rather modest, then these observa-
tions suggest the existence of substantial ‘barriers to survival’ of some type.”
The notion of ‘barriers to survival’ seems particularly relevant to the study of
the shakeouts. One implication of fact A above is that there is a period of
time when the industry experiences mass entry, this is around the peak of the
Bell-shape. Then fact B (‘barriers to survival’) naturally implies that there is
a period of mass exit (that follows the mass entry). This is shakeout (in the
classical interpretation of the term).
The above two facts basically challenge any theories of shakeouts to address
the following two questions concerning entry and exit: (a) “Why does entry
spread out over time, particularly not concentrate on the beginning of the in-
dustry?” (b) “What constitute the barriers to survival?” The theory developed
in this paper can explain both facts A and B. First, by formulating an S-shape
diﬀusion curve across submarkets, the model predicts that the time path of
aggregate market entry follows a Bell-shape. Therefore entry is unlikely to con-
centrate on the beginning of the industry. Second, the model proposes that some
time after entry each ﬁrm in a submarket will have to face the requirement of
a sunk investment (of endogenously determined amount), which is necessary
for increasing the product quality5 and (hence) remaining competitive in the
market. Equilibrium analysis dictates that it would not be proﬁtable for the
marginal ﬁrm to stay should all existing ﬁrms stay, therefore predicts an occur-
rence of exit, a shakeout, in each submarket. The theory therefore attributes
the barriers to survival to the endogenous sunk costs.6
An alternative theoretically well-founded explanation for contemporaneous
exit and entry (in the same industry) is the ‘passive learning’ mechanism orig-
inated by Jovanovic (1982). In an industry where ﬁrms are heterogeneous in
their costs, potential entrants are assumed to know the mean and standard de-
viation of all ﬁrms’ costs but not their own mean expectations. Upon incurring
a sunk entry cost, an entrant starts to receive a noisy signal about its mean
5This can be easily extended to include cost reduction. The essence is to incur an endoge-
nous level of sunk investment to acquire some ﬁxed inputs (as opposed to variable inputs)
with eﬀect of shifting demand curve upward or marginal cost curve downward.
6For a comprehensive account on the role of endogenous sunk costs in determining market
structure, see Sutton (1991) and Sutton (1998).
4expectation of cost level. An incumbent ﬁrm updates its belief about its mean
expectation whenever receiving a new signal. Therefore it is possible that some
incumbent ﬁrms exit as their believes drop below a certain threshold level at
the same time as new entrants enter the market with more optimistic believes.
The ‘passive learning’ mechanism thus constitutes a building block which can
be used in a model to explain fact B. In this type of models barriers to survival
come from the downward adjustments of believes held by some ﬁrms about their
(innate) eﬃciency through Bayesian learning.
Hopenhayn (1993) incorporates an akin ‘passive learning’ mechanism into
a perfectly competitive market setting where the proportional growth rate of
demand (at each ﬁxed price level) is assumed to be non-negative but decreases
over time, i.e., the demand growth rate (at each ﬁxed price level) has a Bell-
shape time path. Under the assumption of increasing marginal cost, the model
predicts that the demand increase at each point of time can not be satisﬁed
by incumbent ﬁrms, therefore induces entry. Since entry rate reﬂects demand
growth rate therefore it does follow a Bell-shape time-path.7 Therefore, the
Hopenhayn (1993) model can indeed explain both facts A and B. There is some
similarity between the current paper and Hopenhayn (1993): both ascribe the
continual entry ﬂow to demand growth. A key diﬀerence, however, is that in
our analysis, the relevant economic market is a submarket as opposed to the
aggregate market; and we assume that ﬁrms engage in imperfect competition
as opposed to perfect competition.
The paper by Horvath, Schivardi and Woywode (2001), which also features
a ‘passive learning’ mechanism, seeks to explain the entry pattern leading to
industry shakeouts. It attributes the delay and build up in the Bell-shape entry
process (fact A) to an information accumulation process. In their explanation,
an initial reluctance in entry reﬂects some uncertainty about the proﬁtability
of the market, and a pessimistic prior belief held by potential entrants. The
observation of entry and performance by earlier entrants brings more accurate
estimation to potential entrants, encouraging more entry and in turn further
improving the accuracy of estimate. As a result, entry may have a modest
start, gradually accelerated pace over time and an explosive culmination prior
to the shakeout phase.
There are a number of models that emphasize the role of technical changes
in explaining shakeout (e.g., Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), Klepper and
Graddy (1990) and Klepper (1996)). What these models have in common is
that ﬁrms have diﬀerent success in innovations and consequently diﬀer in their
eﬃciency (competitiveness). Eﬃciency gaps create barriers to survival for the
weakest ﬁrms who subsequently exit. (This feature is shared by our model.) As
for entry pattern, Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) attributes each occurrence
7Hopenhayn (1993) also studied the conditions under which endogenous demand/output
growth could be induced by exogenous continuous cost-reducing technical progress under
perfect competition, and how this could result in a Bell-shape time path of entry. For the
results to hold in this setting, one needs to impose, among other things, some restrictive
structure on the demand function (or more precisely, on demand elasticity as a function of
output).
5of entry to an instance of exogenous technical shock, e.g., invention or reﬁne-
ment, which creates a new entry opportunity. In Klepper and Graddy (1990)
and Klepper (1996), technical changes are treated as a gradual endogenous
process, the models are silent about what particular pattern the entry process
should follow. Therefore, none of these models provide a natural explanation
for fact A.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 3 lays out the model.
Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium of each submarket, and derives the ﬁrm
survival pattern, and the aggregation across submarkets. Section 5 calibrates
the model to the data of the U.S. tire industry, in particular, to the delineation
of the submarkets, and simulates its dramatic shakeout. Section 6 concludes.
3 The model
The model is cast in discrete time. The industry at time t = 0 is a collection of b
initially inactive independent submarkets with identical demand structure. The
only link among submarkets is an exogenous aggregate diﬀusion process that
determines when a particular submarket becomes active and when production
starts (as a function of how many submarkets are already in operation). Corre-
spondingly there is an aggregate timing relative to the industry as a whole and
the timing in each particular submarket. We proceed to analyze the aggregate
timing by describing the aggregate diﬀusion process in section 3.1. In section
3.2 the timing of a particular submarket is analyzed. In section 3.3 the demand
and cost structures, and some related algebra in a submarket is introduced.
3.1 Aggregate diﬀusion
The aggregate diﬀusion process is regulated by the following dynamic law of
motion:
kt+1 − kt = akθ
t (b − kt) for t ≥ 1, (1)
0 < k1 ≤ 1
which is a generalized logistic equation89, where kt is the number of active
submarkets at time t. Parameter b > 1 is the total number of submarkets in
the industry10. Parameters a and θ aﬀect the rate of diﬀusion.
8Such equation can be derived from some more basic principles.
9The logistic equation originated by Verhulst (1838) is a common model of population
growth, which has found applications in a range of ﬁelds, from biology to economics. This
and the related logistic function (S-curve) have been widely used in the studies of diﬀusion of
innovations (for example, see Griliches (1957); Rogers (1962). In this paper we model the life
cycle of a new industry as the process of diﬀusion of a new product invention. The analysis is
based on the novel assumption that the basic unit of the diﬀusion process is an ‘approximately’
independent submarket.
10To ensure kt ≤ b, one can use the following modiﬁed formula:
kt+1 − kt = min
￿
akθ
t (b − kt),b − kt
￿
.
6Figure 2 is illustrative of some general features of the diﬀusion curve (S-
shape): (i) it is initially convex (approximately exponential) up to some point,
then (ii) it becomes concave, and ﬁnally (iii) it becomes ﬂat. Accordingly, the
rate of diﬀusion, as depicted in Figure 3, initially increases up to a peak, then
declines, ﬁnally converges to zero (Bell-shape). Since the rate of submarket
activation follows a Bell-shape curve, this provides an explanation for why the
time path of industry-wide entry has a Bell-shape (fact A).
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
10
20
30
40
50
t
Figure 2: kt : S-shape
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
t
Figure 3: kt+1 − kt : Bell-shape
73.2 Timing of a submarket
The complete timing in a submarket is: (i) ﬁrst a new product is exogenously
invented in submarket j (in this case submarket j is the ﬁrst market to be
activated in the industry) or it is introduced from a diﬀerent submarket into
submarket j by the exogenous diﬀusion process. Firms in submarket j have to
decide simultaneously if entering production of such new good: in this case a
forward looking free entry condition applies. This is time tj = 0 for submarket
j. (ii) After entry, all ﬁrms initially play a symmetric Cournot game of quantity
competition. This is from time tj = 0 to time tj = Tj for submarket j. (iii)
At some random point of time Tj (determined by the outcome of a random
search process) an innovation arrives in the submarket and presents all existing
ﬁrm with the option to incur an endogenous sunk cost to increase the quality of
their products. The ﬁrms’ decisions on whether making the sunk investments or
not are in fact determining if staying or exiting: a second zero proﬁt condition
applies for them and a shakeout might take place. (iv) For times tj ≥ Tj
the remaining ﬁrms play a repeated static Cournot game with diﬀerentiated
quality. The game in a submarket is solved with backward induction starting
from time Tj. The timing of events in a submarket here is similar to Jovanovic
and MacDonald (1994). A key diﬀerence though is the endogenous sunk cost
component which is explained in section 3.3.
3.3 Demand, innovation and sunk costs
To economize on notions, all the subscripts (submarket labels) to endogenous
variables are omitted (unless likely to cause confusion). Also all common para-
meter notations and values are shared across submarkets.
In submarket j, there are a number S of identical consumers. Hence parame-
ter S measures the size of the submarket. The product is vertically diﬀerentiable.
Each consumer’s preference is given by the following static quasi-linear utility
function:
U =
N ￿
i=1
uiqi −
1
2
N ￿
i=1
N ￿
l=1
qiql + y
s.t. :
N ￿
i=1
piqi + y ≤ I
where N is the number of active ﬁrms that oﬀer a positive quantity of vertically
diﬀerentiable product, ui and qi are the quality and quantity supplied by ﬁrm
i, y is the numeraire, I is the income.
The ﬁrst order necessary condition of the above maximization program im-
plies the following inverse demand function
pi = ui −
N ￿
l=1
ql. (2)
8Each ﬁrm has a production technology which has constant returns to scale,
and the marginal cost is normalized to 0 for all ﬁrms. When the number of
ﬁrms and their respective levels of quality are ﬁxed, all active ﬁrms compete a la
Cournot.11 Hence, each ﬁrm’s objective is given by the following maximization
program:
maxΠi = S
￿
ui −
N ￿
l=1
ql
￿
qi.
The implied reaction function is
qi =
ui −
￿
l￿=i ql
2
for i = 1,2,··· ,N. (3)
Summing up the above family of equations and solving for
￿N
i=1 qi yields
N ￿
i=1
qi =
1
(N + 1)
N ￿
i=1
ui, (4)
Inserting eq. (4) into eq. (3) and (2) gives us the equilibrium output, price and
market share at individual ﬁrm level as follows
qi = pi = ui −
1
(N + 1)
N ￿
l=1
ul, (5)
mi (ui;u−i) =
ui +
￿N
l=1 (ui − ul)
￿N
l=1 ul
. (6)
The implied equilibrium proﬁt of each active ﬁrm in each period is given by
Πi (ui;u−i) = Sπi (ui;u−i) =
S
(N + 1)
2
￿
ui +
N ￿
l=1
(ui − ul)
￿2
, (7)
conditional on all ﬁrms: i = 1,2,··· ,N being active; where u−i = (ul)N−1 for
l ￿= i is the vector of all rivals’ levels of quality; πi (ui;u−i) is the normalized
proﬁt function (for unit market size). A ﬁrm’s proﬁt ﬂow is discounted by the
factor 1
1+r, where r is the constant interest rate.
At time tj = 0, if a ﬁrm enters submarket j, it incurs an sunk entry cost
σ > 0 and obtains the basic level of quality u = 1. Meanwhile the submarket
(as a whole) also enters a random search for an innovation. In each period, with
hazard rate ρ ∈ (0,1) the innovation may arrive. There is only one innovation
in each submarket. The random searches are i.i.d. across periods. It repeats in
each new period until the innovation arrives. This is time tj = Tj. From time
tj = 0 to time tj = Tj all ﬁrms in submarket j keep the basic quality level u = 1.
At time tj = Tj, each ﬁrm is given the option to incur a sunk cost F (ui) to
11For reference on the Cournot game with diﬀerentiated quality, see Sutton (1991) and
Sutton (1998).
9increase quality level to ui > 1. All the ﬁrms need to decide simultaneously on
their levels of investment (and product quality). If investment occurs, quality
level ui remains for time tj ≥ Tj. If no investment is made, a ﬁrm’s product
quality is kept at u = 1. The ﬁxed cost (as opposed to marginal cost) function
F (ui) is given by
F (ui) = σu
β
i , for ui > 1 (8)
where β > 2 is the elasticity of the ﬁxed cost with respect to quality, a mea-
surement of cost (in)eﬀectiveness of the investment12 in raising quality level.
4 Equilibrium analysis
The important parameters of submarkets are market size relative to entry cost
S/σ, and the elasticity of sunk cost w.r.t. quality β. We are interested in the
range of these parameters that enables shakeouts. Intuitively, dramatic shake-
outs require substantial initial entry, which can only happen if the market size
is suﬃciently large relative to entry cost. Also shakeouts depend on the prod-
uct quality diﬀerence between investing (surviving) and non-investing (exiting)
ﬁrms being suﬃciently large. This occurs if market size is large because larger
market size rationalizes larger endogenous sunk cost and higher quality level.
For these two reasons, we assume that the size of each submarket relative to
entry cost S/σ is suﬃciently large. Quantitatively, we make the following two
assumptions:
Assumption 1
S
σ
> (1 + r)
￿
β
2
+ 1
￿2
. (A1)
Assumption 2
S
σ
> r
￿
β
2
￿2
2β. (A2)
For a given value of S/σ both assumption 1 and 2 put some (moderate)
restriction on the value of β. They request that the sunk investment should be
suﬃciently cost eﬀective in raising quality level.
The solution concept used in this paper is sub-game perfect Nash equilib-
rium. For tractability, the analysis is conﬁned to symmetric equilibrium, where
all identical active ﬁrms in a submarket play identical strategies. For conve-
nience, we also abstract from the integer eﬀect by allowing the numbers of ﬁrms
to be real numbers, therefore forward looking zero-proﬁt conditions apply to
the marginal ﬁrms. Using backward induction, we start from the time tj = Tj
subgame.
12This can be interpreted as R&D, advertising or other (ﬁxed) marketing expenditures.
104.1 Time tj = Tj
Denote by N1 the number of existing ﬁrms in submarket j from time tj = 0 to
tj = Tj, and denote by N2 the number of ﬁrms in the symmetric equilibrium of
time tj = Tj subgame. We proceed by assuming N2 < N1 so that there exists
a marginal ﬁrm which is indiﬀerent between ‘stay’ and ‘exit’. (The justiﬁcation
of this assumption will be provided in sections 4.2 and 4.3. See Lemma 2 and
Proposition 1.) A representative (surviving) ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ function is given by
S
r(N2 + 1)
2
￿
ui +
N2 ￿
l=1
(ui − ul)
￿2
− σu
β
i . (9)
We characterize the symmetric equilibrium outcome by deriving the following
two conditions. The ﬁrst is the ﬁrst order condition for maximizing (9) in a
symmetric outcome with ui = ¯ u for i = 1,2,··· ,N2:
2N2S
r(N2 + 1)
2 ¯ u − βσ¯ uβ−1 = 0. (10)
The second is a zero-proﬁt condition:
S
r(N2 + 1)
2 ¯ u2 − σ¯ uβ = 0. (11)
It is easy to show these two conditions dictate the equilibrium value of N2 as
N2 =
β
2
. (12)
From (11) it follows that
¯ u =



S
rσ
￿
β
2 + 1
￿2



1
β−2
. (13)
4.2 Time tj = 0
Given the fact that the payoﬀ to each ﬁrm in playing any time tj = Tj subgame
is zero, the reduced form time tj = 0 game is the following. Firms in submarket
j need to decide if to pay the entry cost σ and produce or not. If a ﬁrm enters,
its net proﬁt per period will be determined by eq. (7) and the game will last
until the random point of time tj = Tj.
In a symmetric equilibrium, conditional on Tj = τ, a ﬁrm’s expected present
value (at time tj = 0) of net proﬁt ﬂow is given by
S
(N1 + 1)
2
τ ￿
i=1
(1 + r)
−i − σ, (14)
11with probability for Tj = τ being:
Pr(Tj = τ) = (1 − ρ)
(τ−1) ρ. (15)
The implied zero-proﬁt condition then is
∞ ￿
τ=1
S
(N1 + 1)
2
τ ￿
i=1
(1 + r)
−i (1 − ρ)
(τ−1) ρ − σ = 0, (16)
which can be simpliﬁed to
S
(ρ + r)(N1 + 1)
2 − σ = 0.
The implied number of ﬁrms is
N1 =
￿
S
(ρ + r)σ
− 1. (17)
It is trivial to show:
Lemma 1 N1 increases in S, decreases in σ, ρ and r.
The next lemma compares the numbers of ﬁrms and levels of quality prior
to and after the innovation.
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, N1 > N2 and ¯ u > 1.
Proof. From eq. (12) and (17) it is immediate that
N1 > N2 if
S
σ
> (ρ + r)
￿
β
2
+ 1
￿2
.
The condition holds under Assumption 1. Similarly, from (13) it follows that
¯ u > 1 if
S
σ
> r
￿
β
2
+ 1
￿2
;
the condition also holds under Assumption 1.
4.3 Submarket shakeout
In this section we begin by showing that after the innovation arrives in a sub-
market, the investing ﬁrms’ quality increase is so large that the non-investing
ﬁrms’ market share reduces to zero, i.e., they exit. This causes a submarket
shakeout.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 2, the (N1 − N2) non-investing ﬁrms’ mar-
ket share is zero.
12Proof. The market share of a non-investing ﬁrm (with u = 1) when play-
ing a static Cournot game with N2 investing ﬁrms (with quality level u = ¯ u)
(according to (6)) is given by
mi
￿
1;(¯ u)N2
￿
=
1 + N2 (1 − ¯ u)
1 + N2¯ u
,
which is non-positive if
¯ u ≥
N2 + 1
N2
. (18)
Substituting eq. (12) and (13) into the above inequality and reorganizing yield
the following inequality:
S
σ
≥ r
￿
β
2 + 1
￿β
￿
β
2
￿β−2 . (19)
Under Assumption 2 we have
S
σ
> r
￿
β
2
￿2
2β.
Given that β > 2, then it is easy to show that inequality (19) holds.
The timing of the shakeout in submarket j is given by the random variable
Tj, with probability distribution (see eq. (15)):
Pr(Tj = τ) = (1 − ρ)
(τ−1) ρ for τ = 1,2,··· ,∞.
Thus the expected timing of a shakeout in submarket j is the mean of Tj:
¯ Tj =
∞ ￿
τ=1
τ (1 − ρ)
(τ−1) ρ, (20)
implying the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The expected timing of a shakeout in submarket j is given by
¯ Tj =
1
ρ
. (21)
Proof. Given eq. (20), the result follows immediately from the algebra:
¯ Tj =
∞ ￿
τ=1
τ (1 − ρ)
(τ−1) ρ = −ρ
∂
∂ρ
￿
∞ ￿
τ=1
(1 − ρ)
τ
￿
= −ρ
∂
∂ρ
￿
1 − ρ
ρ
￿
=
1
ρ
.
134.4 Firm dynamics
Now we look at a ﬁrm’s prospect in submarket j on equilibrium path. At time
tj = 0, the ﬁrm enters the submarket as a low-quality ﬁrm, and will stay as a
low-quality ﬁrm from time tj = 0 to time tj = Tj. It is going to experience
a submarket shakeout arrived randomly at time tj = Tj. In that case with
probability N2
N1 the ﬁrm will become a high-quality ﬁrm and stay active forever
after; with probability 1 − N2
N1 the ﬁrm will exit the submarket and stay out
forever.
The probability distribution of the timing of submarket shakeout described
by eq. (15) implies the following proposition:
Proposition 3 A ﬁrm’s probability of surviving the age of s is
Pr(life > s) = 1 −
N1 − N2
N1
s ￿
τ=1
(1 − ρ)
(τ−1) ρ, (22)
which decreases with age s. Or, equivalently, A ﬁrm’s hazard rate of exit by age
s is
Pr(life ≤ s) =
N1 − N2
N1
(1 − (1 − ρ)
s), (23)
which increases with age s.
Proposition 3 provides an explanation for why entrants suﬀer ‘high infant
mortality rates’ (fact B). See below.
Corollary 3 If market size S and the hazard rate of innovation ρ are suﬃ-
ciently large, a ﬁrm’s hazard rate of exit by the age s = 2 can exceed any given
threshold value z, i.e., Pr(life ≤ s) ≥ z for 0 < z < 1.
Proof. It suﬃces to prove that Pr(life ≤ 2) → 1 as S → ∞ and ρ → 1.
Eq. (23) determines that
Pr(life ≤ 2) =
N1 − N2
N1
￿
1 − (1 − ρ)
2
￿
.
From Proposition 1 it follows that N1 → ∞ and hence N1−N2
N1 → 1 as S → ∞.
Also,
￿
1 − (1 − ρ)
2￿
→ 1 as ρ → 1. Then it is immediate that
Pr(life ≤ 2) → 1 as S → ∞ and ρ → 1.
4.5 Aggregation across submarkets
In this section we derive the expected values of industry-wide aggregate vari-
ables. The approach is to aggregate across submarkets and across ﬁrms within
14each submarket. To aggregate across submarkets we consider one representative
ﬁrm in each submarket. Since we know each (representative) ﬁrm’s stochastic
dynamics we can aggregate (and take expectation) across the representative
ﬁrms. To (further) aggregate across ﬁrms within each submarket, we can sim-
ply scale the aggregation across the representative ﬁrms by a factor of N1. The
following are a list of aggregate variables and their deﬁnitions:13
Gross entry Gt:
Gt ￿ N1 (kt − kt−1), (24)
where kt is the number of active submarkets at time t (see eq. (1));
Gross exit Xt:
Xt ￿
N1 − N2
N1
t−1 ￿
i=1
￿
Gi (1 − ρ)
(t−1−i) ρ
￿
; (25)
Net entry Et:
Et ￿ Gt − Xt; (26)
Number of ﬁrms Ct:
Ct ￿
t ￿
i=1
Ei; (27)
Number of high-quality ﬁrms Ht:
Ht ￿
N2
N1
t ￿
i=1
￿
Gi
￿
1 − (1 − ρ)
t−i￿￿
; (28)
Number of low-quality ﬁrms Lt:
Lt ￿
t ￿
i=1
￿
Gi (1 − ρ)
t−i￿
. (29)
From eq. (5) it follows that a low-quality ﬁrm’s quantity and price are given
by:
qL = pL =
1
N1 + 1
, (30)
and a high-quality ﬁrm’s quantity and price are:
qH = pH =
¯ u
N2 + 1
, (31)
where ¯ u is determined by eq. (13). It is trivial to show that qH > qL. To make
prices comparable, it is helpful to use quality-adjusted price for high-quality
product, as formulated below:
pH − (¯ u − 1) =
1 − N2 (¯ u − 1)
N2 + 1
. (32)
13All the following aggregate variable names should start with the word “expected” and
end with the phrase “at time t”, which are omitted for simplicity.
15We can now look back to provide an intuitive explanation for non-investing ﬁrms’
exit after the innovation. It is easy to show that if ¯ u > N2+1
N2 (see condition
(18)), then
pH − (¯ u − 1) < 0,
i.e., the quality-adjusted price at which the high-quality ﬁrms compete is nega-
tive, and hence below the marginal cost of the low-quality ﬁrms (which is zero).
For completeness we deﬁne two additional aggregate variables as follow:
Industry-wide total output:
Qt = LtqL + HtqH
= Lt
1
N1 + 1
+ Ht
¯ u
N2 + 1
; (33)
Industry-wide (output-weighted) average quality-adjusted price:
Pt =
LtqL
LtqL + HtqH
pL +
HtqH
LtqL + HtqH
(pH − (¯ u − 1))
= pL +
1
1 +
qL
qH
Lt
Ht
(pH − (¯ u − 1) − pL)
=
1
N1 + 1
−
N2(¯ u−1)−1
N2+1 + 1
N1+1
1 +
¯ u
N2+1
N1+1
Lt
Ht
. (34)
5 Calibration and simulation
In what follows we calibrate the model to simulate a dramatic instance of in-
dustry shakeouts. Particularly, we simulate the time paths of entry, exit and
the number of ﬁrms at the industry level; the time path of each entry cohort
population; and the ﬁrm survival rate over age. The model is calibrated to
(the particular moments of) the data of the U.S. automotive tire industry for
the period 1905-1980 (drawn from French (1991); Klepper and Simons (2000),
Klepper and Simons (2001); Klepper (2002)). We proceed to deﬁne the submar-
kets of the U.S. automotive tire industry in section 5.1. In section 5.2 the model
is calibrated treating submarkets as perfectly independent. Given the fact that
(empirically speaking) independence between submarkets is only an approxi-
mation, in section 5.3 the model is reinterpreted and re-calibrated to take into
account economies of scope that limit the independence between submarkets.
5.1 Deﬁning submarkets of the U.S. tire industry
A ﬁrst division of the market for the U.S. automotive tire manufacturers was
between the original equipment (OE) market which accounted for about 30 per-
cent of all tires sold and the replacement market where the rest 70 percent
was sold. The buyers in the OE market were the automotive manufacturers
(e.g., General Motors and Ford) and the tires were sold as parts of the new
16automotive vehicles. The end buyers in the replacement market were automo-
tive vehicle owners, who bought the tires (and the ﬁtting services) from local
retail tire suppliers. The service between manufacturing and retail was whole-
sale distribution. Tire manufacturers were highly involved in tire marketing.
In the replacement market, manufacturers typically invested in advertisement
which mainly targeted the end buyers. According to French (1991), since the
early history of the U.S. automotive tires industry it had been common that
tire manufacturers vertically integrated into the tire wholesale sector. Leading
manufacturers started investing in (wholesale) branch stores as early as 1909.
Manufacturers also developed their relationship with retailers through dealer
programs. Exclusive territories were allocated to dealers according to the size
of local markets; advertising material and marketing advice were provided.14
There were diﬀerent types of tires designed for diﬀerent types of vehicles
and diﬀerent driving conditions. Product diﬀerentiation limited (demand-side)
substitution and segmented the tires market into several product submarkets.
Roughly the market was divided among passenger (and light truck) tires, medium
and heavy truck (and bus) tires, and miscellaneous speciality tires (agricultural,
industrial, mining, military, aviation, racing, etc.). Tires in the same category
might also come in diﬀerent sizes. The passenger tires market was the biggest
product submarket.
Transportation cost reduced the substitutability between tires made avail-
able from distant locations. By investing in geographical distribution capacities
(e.g., wholesale warehouses), a tire manufacturer could reduce the marginal
transportation and logistic costs, and (conditional on suﬃciently large quan-
tity of output) could save on average transportation and logistic costs. Despite
the fact that tire manufacturers had their factories disproportionately located
around Akron, Ohio, it was evident that without adequate investment in distri-
bution capacity in a particular geographical submarket, ceteris paribus a ﬁrm
could not compete in that submarket vis-a-vis rivals that did invest adequately.
That was one of the reasons why the leading tire manufacturers found it impor-
tant to invest in (wholesale) branch stores.
Given the tremendous geographical size of the U.S., the transportation and
logistic costs factor segmented the replacement passenger tires market into many
geographical submarkets. A natural candidate deﬁnition of the geographical
submarkets roughly matched the 50 states. We consider a state X contained
(at least) one geographical submarket of replacement passenger tires if (i) X’s
land area exceeded 31,400 square miles15; or (ii) X contained at least one entire
metropolitan area16. According to this criterion, the only two states did not
qualify were Delaware and Vermont. In contrast, Texas and California were the
two states which had land areas at least four times as large as the threshold
14Retail tire dealers (and wholesale tire deals when applicable) could be seen as agents who
worked for the tire manufacturers, to undertake part of their tire marketing tasks. Product
quality, availability, and price were among the main factors that aﬀected the dealers’ loyalty,
which the manufacturers competed to maintain.
15This is the area of an circle with radius of 100 miles.
16The 1950 (the earliest available) oﬃcial deﬁnition of standard metropolitan areas is used.
17value, and had multiple entire metropolitan areas. We propose that each of
these two states had (at least) two geographical submarkets. Overall, it is safe
to say there were (at least) 50 submarkets of replacement passenger tires in
the U.S.. The number of geographical submarkets of OE (original equipment)
tires were very limited because the automotive manufacturers (the buyers) were
concentrated in one location - Detroit. Similarly, the geographical extents of
other product submarkets of replacement tires could be diﬀerent (from the re-
placement passenger tire submarkets), therefore the number of geographical
submarkets thereof could be diﬀerent (from the replacement passenger tire sub-
markets), e.g., smaller.
The deﬁnition of submarkets relies on applying the idea of “marked gaps in
the chain of substitutes” (Robinson (1954)). As part of the market deﬁnition
exercise one (also) needs to examine the degree of supply-side substitution (in
addition to demand-side substitution), i.e., the possibility and readiness for
ﬁrms that are not currently producing a product, to switch to supplying the
product if its price is high enough. For instance, it would be easy for a ﬁrm
that produces passenger tire of a particular size to switch to producing the
same type of tire of another size. Also, it would be easier for a passenger
tire producer to become a light truck tire supplier than to become a heavy
truck tire seller. Here the same principle applies: close substitutes should be
considered belonging to the same submarkets while distant substitutes should be
categorized to separate submarkets. A “marked gap” (in the supply-side chain
of substitution) exists if there is immobility (of some essential ﬁxed inputs)
across the submarket boundaries. To put it in another way, a deﬁning feature
of a submarket is its speciﬁc sunk investment requirement to entrants. In the
example of the tire industry, this investment could be in warehouse and sales
oﬃce at a particular geographical region or location; local marketing/advertising
expenditure; securing (essential) local supply of inputs; R&D on speciﬁc tires
(design, test, etc.); molds and equipment designed for producing speciﬁc tires.
Inadequacy in such sunk investments would deprive a ﬁrm the ability to compete
eﬀectively in the particular submarket in question.
Perfectly independent submarkets are those that share neither demand-side
linkage nor supply-side linkage between them. Perfectly independent submar-
kets do not exist in the real world, where submarkets are at best approximately
independent from each other. The most important omission from a model of
perfectly independent submarkets is economies of scope. Panzar and Willig
(1981) state that economies of scope exist if there is spare capacity in an in-
put of producing a product, which can be used to produce another product. A
sharable, “quasi-public” input is thereby particularly relevant. Spare capacity
of this sort is to what Panzar and Willig (1981) attribute the origin of multiple-
product ﬁrms.17 In the U.S. automotive tire industry, some ﬁxed inputs had
this “quasi-public” input property. For example, certain knowledge and know-
17Some extent of incompleteness or friction of contracting over the use of the spare capacity
must have an implicit role in the argument. Otherwise, the ﬁrm that owns the spare capacity
should be indiﬀerent between leasing it to another ﬁrm that produces the other product and
producing both products.
18how of rubber chemistry and tire building, once acquired, could be applied to
producing additional types of tires. Also, excess production capacities, once
built, could be used to produce additional types of tires, or supply additional
geographical submarkets. And indeed all the major tire manufactures18 were
multiple-product ﬁrms, and they all operated in multiple geographical submar-
kets.
5.2 Calibration I
We set the calendar years 1904-1906 as time t = 1 of the model (one time
period of the model consists of 3 calendar years), therefore years 1961-1963 is
time t = 20 (which is the last period of our simulation19). The number of
entry (exit) per period then corresponds to the three-year sum of annual entries
(exits).
We set the total number of submarkets to b = 50.20 From Klepper (2002) we
can infer that the total number of entry in the tire industry during 1905-1980
was 616, and the number of ﬁrms stabilized around 30 near the end of the sample
period. We therefore calibrate the model to generate the total number entry
bN1 = 616. It follows from b = 50 that N1 = 12.32. To make bN2 to approach
30 (the number of ﬁrms at the end of the sample period), we set N2 = 1.1 and
hence bN2 = 55.
We normalize parameter σ to 1 and set the interest rate at r = 0.05. By
choosing β = 2.2 we have N2 = 1.1. We choose the values of parameters
ρ = 0.59209, a = 0.0257, θ = 0.96 and k1 = 0.7 such that the simulated gross
entry Gt peaks at time t = 7 with G7 = 57, and the simulated number of ﬁrms
Ct peaks at time t = 7 with C7 = 275. These simulated values match the data
(peak entry of 57 and peak ﬁrm number of 275 in 1922, see Klepper and Simons
(2000)).
Equation (1) determines the aggregate diﬀusion process. The calibrated
generalized logistic equation is the following:
kt+1 − kt = 0.0257k0.96
t (50 − kt),
k1 = 0.7.
The implied ﬁrm hazard rate of exit by the age of 2 (i.e., 6 years old) is
Pr(life ≤ 2) =
N1 − N2
N1
￿
1 − (1 − ρ)
2
￿
= 0.75918,
18The largest four U.S. tire manufacturers during 1926-1980 were Goodyear, Firestone, B.F.
Goodrich, U.S. Rubber (later Uniroyal).
19What happened between 1964 and 1980 did not have any dramatic impact on entry, exit
and the number of ﬁrms.
20The crude submarket deﬁnition exercise in section 5.1 suggests that the number of submar-
kets in the U.S. tire industry could signiﬁcantly exceed 50. Given the fact that economies of
scope could limit the independence between submarkets, here we deliberately admit a smaller
number of submarkets so that the submarkets whose entry process was heavily aﬀected by
economies of scope are excluded. In so doing, the assumption of independent submarkets
remains a reasonable approximation.
19which clearly suggests a high rate of ‘infant mortality’ among new entrants.
From eq. (17) we can derive
S = (N1 + 1)
2 (ρ + r)σ = 113.92.
It is straight forward to verify that this parameter of market size satisﬁes both
Assumption 1 and 2.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize all the speciﬁed parameter values and the implied
variable values.
Table 1: Calibration I
Parameter: a b θ k1 σ r β ρ S
Value: 0.0257 50 0.96 0.7 1 0.05 2.2 0.59209 113.92
Table 2: The implied values of variables (I)
Variable: N1 N2 Pr(life ≤ 2)
Value: 12.32 1.1 0.75918
The simulation results, which are presented in Figures 4-6, illustrate the
model’s ability to account for the empirical regularities (facts A and B) associ-
ated with industry shakeouts. Figure 4 shows the simulated time paths of entry,
exit and the number of ﬁrms (in the thin lines), together with the actual time
series (in the thick lines). The simulated patterns capture some of key empirical
features displayed in the actual time series. The simulated time path of entry,
which reﬂects the opening of submarkets, has a Bell-shape. This shows that the
model provides a natural explanation for fact A. A positive correlation exists
between the simulated time path of exit and that of lagged entry, which is driven
by the pattern of shakeout within each submarket. The link between the two
time paths is clearly featured by ‘mass exit follows mass entry’. The simulated
number of ﬁrms rises when entry exceeds exit; it falls when exit exceeds entry.
Since the peak of the simulated exit closely follows that of the simulated entry,
exit surpasses entry shortly after the peak of the latter. That is why we see en-
try peaks shortly prior to the peak of the number of ﬁrms. The simulated time
paths ﬁt the actual time series quantitatively well except that the simulated
post-shakeout number of ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly higher than the data.
Figure 5 shows the simulated time paths of entry cohort populations for
successive entry cohorts. Each cohort displaces a similar shakeout pattern;
however, the initial populations of the entry cohorts vary markedly. The ﬁgure
suggests that the dramatic rise and fall of the number of ﬁrms around the peak
are generated by the impacts of a very few big entry cohorts (5, 6, 7 and 8),
featuring ‘mass entry followed by mass exit’.
20Figure 4: Actual (thick-line) and simulated (thin-line, calibration I) time-paths
of entry, exit and number of ﬁrms
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Figure 5: Simulated numbers of ﬁrms in diﬀerent entry cohorts (calibration I)
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Figure 6: Simulated ﬁrm survival rate over age (calibration I)
The pattern of shakeout in each entry cohort implies a high rate of ‘infant
mortality’, i.e., a high rate of early-age exit hazard (fact B). This stands out
clearly in Figure 6, which shows the simulated ﬁrm survival rates over age.
5.3 Calibration II: introducing economies of scope and
multiple-product ﬁrms
The model originally assumes that the submarkets are perfectly independent,
therefore there are no economies of scope, and multiple-product ﬁrms do not
possess any advantage vis-a-vis single-product ﬁrms. As a result, in equilib-
rium each ﬁrm is a single-product ﬁrm, i.e., operates in only one submarket.21
In this section we relax the assumption of perfect independence between sub-
markets slightly by introducing economies of scope in the following way. Lets
deﬁne established ﬁrms as those that have already had at least one high-quality
product. Suppose that each established ﬁrm has certain spare capacity in some
ﬁxed input(s) (e.g., certain technological knowledge and know-how) that it has
acquired for producing existing product(s). The spare capacity can be used in
producing a new product and therefore reduces the ﬁxed cost of producing the
new product. This gives an established ﬁrm an advantage vis-a-vis a new ﬁrm
in ‘competing for’ (i.e., entering) the new submarket. We assume that the entry
cost for an established ﬁrm is σ − ε (ε > 0) as opposed to σ for a new ﬁrm.
At time tj = 0 for submarket j, among potential entrants, there is a ﬁnite
number of established ﬁrms, and an inﬁnite number of new ﬁrms. Since a zero-
proﬁt condition applies to the marginal entrant, by ignoring the integer eﬀect, it
can be shown that in equilibrium (i) all established ﬁrms enter if their number
21Although in principle it is possible to have an equilibrium outcome where some ﬁrms
operate in multiple submarkets, the probability of such an outcome is zero if we assume the
number of potential entrants is inﬁnity.
22does not exceed the number of entry, and the rest entering ﬁrms are all new
single-product ﬁrms; otherwise, all entering ﬁrms are established ﬁrms.
To simplify the analysis, we take the limit: ε → 0, therefore the established
ﬁrms’ advantage of scope economies does not aﬀect the number of entry and
exit of product units, but to aﬀect the proportion of entrants that are new
single-product ﬁrms. As a result, it also aﬀects the proportion of existing prod-
uct units that are single-product ﬁrms (as opposed to subsidiaries of multiple-
product ﬁrms.)2223 The following additional aggregate variables describe the
entry, exit and number of (independent) ﬁrms (as opposed to subsidiaries of
multiple-product ﬁrms).24
Gross entry of new ﬁrms25 GN
t :
GN
t ￿ max
￿
N1 − HI
t ,0
￿
(kt − kt−1), (35)
where HI
t is the number of established ﬁrms (see deﬁnition below);
Gross exit of new ﬁrms XN
t :
XN
t ￿
N1 − N2
N1
t−1 ￿
i=1
￿
GN
i (1 − ρ)
(t−1−i) ρ
￿
; (36)
Net entry of new ﬁrms EN
t :
EN
t ￿ GN
t − XN
t ; (37)
Number of (independent) ﬁrms CI
t :
CI
t ￿
t ￿
i=1
EN
i ; (38)
Number of established ﬁrms HI
t :
HI
t ￿
N2
N1
t ￿
i=1
￿
GN
i
￿
1 − (1 − ρ)
t−i￿￿
, (39)
and
HI
1 = 0; (40)
Number of low-quality single-product ﬁrms LI
t:
LI
t ￿
t ￿
i=1
￿
GN
i (1 − ρ)
t−i￿
. (41)
22Note: all new ﬁrms are low-quality single-product ﬁrms; all multiple-product ﬁrms are
established ﬁrms; but not all established ﬁrms are multiple-product ﬁrms.
23Since the ﬁxed cost function (8) is not aﬀected by the economies of scope, the hazard rate
of exit is the same for a new (entering) ﬁrm and a new (entering) subsidiary of an established
ﬁrm.
24Again, all the following aggregate variable names should start with the word “expected”
and end with the phrase “at time t”, which are omitted for simplicity.
25A new ﬁrm (at time t) is one which has not competed in any submarket of the industry
previously.
23In what follows we re-calibrate the model. We preserve the values of pa-
rameters θ, σ, r and ρ as in the previous section. We double the number of
submarkets to b = 100.26 We set S = 751.01, β = 4.2, a = 0.0105 and k1 = 0.48
such that the simulated peak number of (independent) ﬁrms matches the actual
magnitude and timing (275 respectively between 1922 − 1924), the simulated
peak number of entry (of new ﬁrms) matches the observed number (57 between
1922−1924), and the simulated number of (independent) ﬁrms for 1958−1960
matches the data (about 40). Under the new calibration, the diﬀusion process
follows
kt+1 − kt = 0.0105k0.96
t (100 − kt)
k1 = 0.48.
It can be shown that the market size parameter S satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 2.
The new calibration values are summarized in Tables 3 and 4, and the simulation
results are presented in Figures 7 and 8.
Table 3: Calibration II
Parameter: a b θ k1 σ r β ρ S
Value: 0.0105 100 0.96 0.48 1 0.05 4.2 0.59209 751.01
Table 4: The implied values of variables (II)
Variable: N1 N2 Pr(life ≤ 2)
Value: 33.2 2.1 0.78088
When we allow ﬁrms to own multiple products there is usually a gap between
the number of products and the number of ﬁrms. The product-ﬁrm discrepancy
as shown in Figure 7 is mainly driven by the fact that the number of ﬁrms
ceases growth while the number of products is still growing. The further increase
in the number of products after the peak of the number of ﬁrms is primarily
attributed to the expansion into new submarkets by established ﬁrms (that
enjoy an advantage of economies of scope vis-a-vis new ﬁrms). New ﬁrms ﬁnd
it harder and harder to enter new submarkets thereafter.
The simulated time paths of entry, exit and number of ﬁrms are presented
in Figure 8, which illustrates that the model (under calibration II) can ﬁt the
26Since in this section we re-interpret the model to allow economies of scope and multiple-
product ﬁrms, it is now reasonable to admit submarkets which are “less independent” (i.e.,
aﬀected by the economies of scope), and therefore to adopt a larger estimation of the number
of submarkets than in section 5.2.
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Figure 7: Simulated numbers of ﬁrms and products (calibration II)
actual data with remarkable accuracy27. Compared with calibration I, this re-
calibration signiﬁcantly improves the ﬁt for the post-shakeout number of ﬁrms.
Under the new interpretation and re-calibration of the model, the post-shakeout
number of ﬁrms is less tied to the number of submarkets because the surviving
ﬁrms can be multiple-product ﬁrms. This increased ﬂexibility of the model
allows admission of a larger number of submarkets and also larger numbers of
competitors in each submarket (both before and after submarket shakeout).
Figure 8: Actual (thick-line) and simulated (thin-line, calibration II) time-paths
of entry, exit and number of ﬁrms
By taking into account the fact that some ﬁrms own multiple products which
are sold in (approximately independent) submarkets, our model of successive
27Naturally the simulated series are smoother than the actual data because the simulation
is based on behavior of the mean which reduces the randomness.
25submarkets conﬁrms Sutton (1998)’s important ﬁnding that the typical dis-
persed ﬁrms size distribution in an industry can be partially attributed to the
fact that ﬁrms do vary widely in the number of submarkets in which one oper-
ates. This is clearly the case in the illustrative example of the U.S. automotive
tire industry.28
Our simulation of the time paths of entry, exit and number of ﬁrms (based
on calibration II) is robust to potential measurement errors in estimating the
total number of submarkets b. Suppose b￿ (in stead of the true value b) is
the estimation, hence introducing measurement error (b￿ − b). Since a and N1
are unobservable parameter and variable, they are determined by calibrating the
model (including b￿ and other pre-determined variable values) to the moments of
the data. The resulting estimates of a and N1, denoted by a￿ and N￿
1, therefore
deviate from their true values, and introduce additional errors (a￿ − a) and
(N￿
1 − N1). Our robustness check exercise shows that (a￿ − a) and (N￿
1 − N1)
have the oppose sign to (b￿ − b). In simulating the time paths of entry, exit and
number of ﬁrms, these measurement error and induced deviations approximately
oﬀset each other and leave no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the simulation. This result is
reassuring about the model’s ability to replicate a dramatic shakeout process.
It shows that the explanatory power of the model does not rely on any arbitrary
element in the empirical submarket deﬁnition exercise.
6 Conclusion
This paper explains contemporaneous exit and entry in a new industry with a
diﬀusion process across submarkets. It allows a re-interpretation of the shake-
out process in some industries in a novel way. A new industry is a collection
of initially inactive submarkets; the timing of their activation is determined
by an exogenous aggregate diﬀusion process. Submarket-speciﬁc sunk costs fa-
cilitate approximate independence of submarkets, which allows new ﬁrms the
opportunities to enter new submarkets. However, the post-entry endogenous
sunk investment requirement induced by innovations also forces exit to follow
entry closely and to a large extent. When the aggregate diﬀusion process is de-
scribed by a plausible generalized logistic equation, and calibrated to the data
of the U.S. tire industry, in particular to the delineation of the submarkets, the
model can match the aggregate market data remarkably well, and replicate the
dramatic shakeout of the U.S. tire industry.
The existing literature on industry shakeouts has emphasized the eﬀect on
ﬁrm survival (and or growth) of exogenous heterogeneity in ﬁrm eﬃciency (see
Klepper and Graddy (1990), Klepper (1996), and Hopenhayn (1993)). The
models in this literature shed light on the ways that the exogenous diﬀerence in
ﬁrm eﬃciency translates (through market competition) into ﬁrm size diﬀerence.
The current paper abstracts from this ‘selection’ aspect of industry shakeouts by
28According to French (1991), the dominant ﬁrms oﬀered full range of tires, and they had
large numbers of branch stores all over the U.S., while the small tire manufaturers only
operated in niche (product) markets, and lacked national distribution.
26assuming away any exogenous heterogeneity among ﬁrms. In doing so the model
acquires the ability to highlight the economic forces that tend to create asym-
metry among ﬁrms purely as an equilibrium outcome. Such forces identiﬁed
here are the endogenous sunk investment requirement induced by innovations,
and economies of scope shared across submarkets. This ﬁnding complements
the existing literature in explaining the uneven ﬁrm size distribution, which is
commonly observed among industries. Having demonstrated the eﬀects of these
economic forces in the current setting, it is conceivable that these factors could
possibly reenforce and amplify the exogenous asymmetry in ﬁrm eﬃciency and
facilitate greater degree of asymmetry in ﬁrm size distribution. Among other
things, it would be interesting (for future research) to investigate whether ﬁrms
diﬀer exogenously in their capabilities of investing in innovations, and exploring
economies of scope across submarkets; and, if yes, what the implications are on
ﬁrms’ entry, exit and expansion decisions, and on ﬁrm size distribution and the
evolution of market structure.
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